My AOS are Formal Epistemology, General Philosophy of Science, and Philosophical Logic. My AOC is Analytic Metaphysics.



(under contract) Counterfactuals and Belief. More Means-End Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.

(2021) Belief and Counterfactuals. A Study in Means-End Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. (hardcover 208 pages / ebook 208 pages)

(2018) A Logical Introduction to Probability and Induction. New York: Oxford University Press. (hardcover 306 pages / ebook 305 pages / paperback 304 pages, excluding a 43 pages instructor’s manual)

(2004) Assessing Theories. The Problem of a Quantitative Theory of Confirmation. PhD Dissertation. Erfurt: University of Erfurt. (urn:nbn:de:gbv:547-200400640)


Papers in Refereed Journals

(2017a) On the Justification of Deduction and Induction. European Journal for the Philosophy of Science 7 (3), 507-534. local file

(2017b) Why Follow the Royal Rule? Synthese 194 (5), 1565-1590. local file

(2015a) How to Learn Concepts, Consequences, and Conditionals. αnalytica 1 (1), 20-36. open access!

(2015b) What Should I Believe About What Would Have Been the Case? Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1), 81-110. local file

(2015c) with P. Brössel, Bayesian Confirmation: A Means With no End. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4), 737-749. local file

(2014a) New Foundations for Counterfactuals. Synthese 191 (10), 2167-2193. local file

(2014b) For True Conditionalizers Weisberg’s Paradox is a False Alarm. Symposion 1 (1), 111-119. open access!

(2014c) What is the Permissibility Solution a Solution of? – A Question for Kroedel. Logos and Episteme 5 (3), 333-342. open access!

(2013a) Structural Equations and Beyond. The Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4), 709-732. local file

(2013b) Belief Revision I: The AGM Theory. Philosophy Compass 8 (7), 604-612. local file

(2013c) Belief Revision II: Ranking Theory. Philosophy Compass 8 (7), 613-621. local file

(2013d) Belief First. The Reasoner 7 (7), 82. open access!

(2013e) with T. Kroedel, Counterfactual Dependence and ArrowNoûs 47 (3), 453-466. local file

(2013f) with P. Brössel, A. Eder, Evidential Support and Instrumental RationalityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2), 279-300. local file

(2011a) Lewis Causation is a Special Case of Spohn CausationBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1), 207-210. local file

(2008a) Milne’s Argument for the Log-Ratio MeasurePhilosophy of Science 75 (4), 413-420. local file

(2008b) Reply to Crupi et al.’s ‘Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence’ ([2008])British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2), 213-215. local file

(2008c) Hempel’s Logic of ConfirmationPhilosophical Studies 139 (2), 181-189. local file

(2008d) Assessing Theories, Bayes StyleSynthese 161 (1), 89-118. local file

(2007a) The Consistency Argument for Ranking FunctionsStudia Logica 86 (2), 299-329. local file

(2007b) The Logic of Theory AssessmentJournal of Philosophical Logic 36 (5), 511-538. local file

(2006a) Ranking Functions and Rankings on LanguagesArtificial Intelligence 170 (4-5), 462-471. local file

(2005a) What Is the Point of Confirmation? Philosophy of Science 72 (5), 1146-1159. local file

(2005b) Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1), 101-116. local file


Encyclopedia Entries

(2019) Ranking Theory. In R. Pettigrew & J. Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. Philpapers Foundation, 397-436. open access!

(2011b) ConfirmationOxford Bibliographies Online. Revised with J. Dallmann in 2017. local file

(2009a) Ranking Functions. In J.R. Rabunal Dopico & J. Dorado de la Calle & A. Pazos Sierra (eds.), Encyclopedia of Artificial Intelligence. Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference, 1351-1355. local file

(2008e) Formal Representations of Belief. In E.N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Revised in 2012 and 2016. Revised with K. Genin in 2020. (25,000+ words) open access!

(2008f) Inductive Logic. In J. Lachs & R. Talisse (eds.), Encyclopedia of American Philosophy. New York: Routledge, 475-478. local file

(2007c) Confirmation and Induction. In J. Fieser & B. Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (15.000+ words) open access!


Other Papers

(2016) Means-End Philosophy. In W. Freitag & H. Rott & H. Sturm & A. Zinke (eds.), Von Rang und Namen. Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Spohn. Münster: Mentis, 173-198.

(2009b) Belief and Degrees of Belief. In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of BeliefSynthese Library 342. Dordrecht: Springer, 1-33. local file

(2007d) The Plausibility-Informativeness Theory. In V.F. Hendricks & D.H. Pritchard (eds.), New Waves in Epistemology. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 164-191. local file

(2005c) The Logic of Confirmation and Theory Assessment. In L. Behounek & M. Bilkova (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2004. Prague: Filosofia, 161-176. local file

(2005d) The Logic of Confirmation. In O. Neumaier & C. Sedmak & M. Zichy (eds.), Philosophische Perspektiven. Beiträge zum VII. Internationalen Kongress der ÖGP. Frankfurt/Main – Lancaster: Ontos, 309-315. local file

(2003) Degrees of Belief as Basis for Scientific Reasoning? In W. Loeffler & P. Weingartner (eds.), Knowledge and Belief. Papers of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg/Wechsel (Austria) 2003. Kirchberg: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 143-146. local file



(2012) Review of Wolfgang Spohn, The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and Its Philosophical Applications (Oxford University Press 2012). Philosophy of Science 79 (4), 584-588. local file

(2006b) Review of Vincent F. Hendricks, Mainstream and Formal Epistemology (Cambridge University Press 2006). Philosophy in Review 26 (4), 257-259. local file



(2009c) ed. with E. Swanson & J. Weisberg, Conditionals and Ranking Functions. Special Issue of Erkenntnis. With contributions by C. Cross, R. Stalnaker, R. Williams, T. Williamson and an Editorial (133-134).

(2009d) ed. with C. Schmidt-Petri, Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library 342. Dordrecht: Springer. With contributions by R. Foley, K. Frankish, R. Haenni, A. Hájek, J. Hawthorne, C. Howson, F. Huber, J. Joyce, D. Makinson, H. Prade & D. Dubois, H. Rott, B. Skyrms, W. Spohn. Paperback edition October 2009.