Introduction

The term “confirmation” is used in epistemology and the philosophy of science whenever observational data and other information that is taken for granted speak in favor of or support scientific theories and everyday hypotheses. Historically, confirmation has been closely related to the problem of induction, the question of what to believe regarding the future given information that is restricted to the past and present. One relation between confirmation and induction is that the conclusion H of an inductively strong argument with premise E is confirmed by E. If inductive strength comes in degrees and the inductive strength of the argument with premise E and conclusion H is equal to r, then the degree of confirmation of H by E is likewise said to be equal to r.

General Overviews

Most overviews on confirmation are also overviews on probability theory and induction, and some the other way round. The reason is simply that Bayesian confirmation theory, by far the most prominent account of confirmation, is based on probability theory and that confirmation theory is a modern answer to the problem of induction. As is true for so many topics in philosophy, the first sources to consult are the relevant entries of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Crupi 2015, Hájek 2003, Romeijn 2014, Talbott 2008, Vickers 2014), which are available online. Other useful sources Easwaran 2011 and Fitelson 2006 as well as the relevant entries of the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (diFate 2007, Huber 2007), which are also available online. A widely used introductory textbook is Skyrms 2000.
Crupi, Vincenzo. “*Confirmation.*” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2015. An excellent overview of Bayesian confirmation theory, hypothetico-deductivist theories, and Hempel’s theory of confirmation by instances that is available online.

diFate, Victor. “*Evidence.*” In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by James Fieser and Bradley Dowden, 2007. An excellent overview with a focus on epistemological questions that is available online.

Easwaran, Kenny. “Bayesianism II: Applications and Criticisms.” Philosophy Compass 6 (2011): 321-332. A broad and accessible overview covering the main applications of Bayesianism. It includes a very good introduction to confirmation theory and clearly explains the central challenges facing such views.


This is an elementary introduction by one of the leading figures in the field.

An excellent overview of Bayesian Epistemology that is available online.

An excellent overview of paradoxes related to induction, including Hume’s problem of induction, that is available online.

Textbooks
Most textbooks currently available share the feature that they all are biased in the sense that their authors not only review the existing literature but also defend particular views. In addition, with the exceptions of Earman 1992, Huber manuscript, and Kyburg & Teng 2001, there is no textbook that tries to cover more than one paradigm. Fitelson 2001, Howson 2008, Howson and Urbach 2006, Jeffrey 1983, and Joyce 1999 favor a Bayesian approach, while Mayo 1996 favors an error statistical approach.

Earman’s Bayes or Bust? is probably the first reference for anybody interested in Bayesian confirmation theory. The book can be used as textbook, though it quickly moves to fairly advanced and mathematically involved topics.

This is Fitelson's PhD thesis that should be replaced by his book Confirmation Theory (in preparation) once the latter has been published.
An accessible introduction to probability theory, interpretations of probability, and decision theory.

This book offers a thorough treatment and defense of Hume's skeptical argument against induction. It also takes up Goodman's “new riddle” of induction, and the scientific realism debate.

Howson and Urbach’s Scientific Reasoning is an opinionated exposition of Bayesian philosophy of science at book length that belongs to the canon of the literature on Bayesian confirmation theory.

An introduction to the probability calculus and its interpretations that also covers deductive approaches to confirmation as well as formal learning theory. It differs from other textbooks by emphasizing the means-end approach to the justification of induction.

This book presents Jeffrey's evidential decision theory. While the topic of the book is not confirmation, it is closely related to it and too important for Bayesianism not to be mentioned here. Among others, Jeffrey formulates an update rule, now known as “Jeffrey conditionalization,” that is applicable when the information received does not come in the form of a certainty or even a proposition.

Causal decision theory is the main alternative to Richard C. Jeffrey’s evidential decision theory, and this book is the standard reference to the former. Joyce's book has been important for Bayesian confirmation theory because of the discussion of the problem of old evidence in chapter 6.
A survey textbook of inductive methods with exercises. It includes discussion of Bayesian confirmation theory, classical frequentist statistics, default logics, theory replacement systems, Dempster-Shafer’s non-standard probabilism, and other formal theories of uncertain inference.

This is Mayo’s book on her error-statistical philosophy of experimentation.

Anthologies
Most anthologies relevant to confirmation, with the exception of Bandyopadhyay and Forster 2011 and Weisberg and Pettigrew forth, are fairly old and do not represent the current state of the art— in particular, those of Carnap and Jeffrey 1971, Hintikka and Suppes 1966, and Jeffrey 1980 are dated. Earman 1983 and Stalker 1994 are thematically focused but contain papers by authors with different views and approaches. Three recent collections of papers (Fetzer and Eells 2010, Hájek and Hitchcock 2016, Huber and Schmidt-Petri 2009) are indirectly devoted to confirmation.

This anthology contains expositions of the philosophy of probability, Bayesian statistics, error statistics, significance testing, confirmation theory, the likelihood paradigm, learning theory, and model selection paradigms such as the Akaikean information criterion and the Bayesian information criterion.

This is an anthology containing some of Rudolf Carnap’s later works, including his “Inductive Logic and Rational Decisions.”

This collection of articles, many of them on Clark Glymour's Theory and Evidence, contains several important articles, among others Daniel Garber’s “Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience in Bayesian Confirmation Theory.”

This is an anthology containing, among others, Branden Fitelson and James Hawthorne's “How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens.”

This anthology contains expositions of the present state of research on issues in philosophy related to probability. It includes Vincenzo Crupi and Katya Tentori's "Confirmation Theory", a very good overview of the present state of research on confirmation theory.

This is a collection of articles on Rudolph Carnap’s project of inductive logic that was influential at the time of its appearance. It contains, among others, Jaakko Hintikka’s “A Two-Dimensional Continuum of Inductive Methods,” which presents a system of inductive logic in which universal generalizations can receive positive probability, something that was not possible in Carnap’s early systems.

This anthology on degrees of belief, which is available as a paperback, contains surveys on alternatives to probabilism such as Dempster-Shafer theory, possibility theory, and ranking theory as well as top-notch articles on probabilism, including a substantially revised and updated version of Joyce 1998 (cited under Modern Bayesian Confirmation Theory).

This is an anthology including David Lewis's “A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance,” in which he formulates the Principal Principle. The latter says that an ideally rational agent’s initial degree of
belief in a proposition $A$ should equal $x$ given that the objective chance of $A$ equals $x$, and no further information that is not admissible. This principle is important for Bayesian confirmation theory, because it allows for the confirmation of statistical hypotheses.

Stalker, Douglas F., ed. Grue! The New Riddle of Induction. Chicago: Open Court, 1994. This is a collection of articles on Nelson Goodman’s new riddle of induction. It is representative up to the time of its appearance.

Weisberg and Pettigrew (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. *PhilPapers[www.philpapers.org]*, forth. This is a collection of state of the art reference articles on subjects in formal epistemology.

Reference Works
This section lists and annotates the milestones in the literature on confirmation and induction in chronological order from David Hume's formulation of the problem of the justification of induction over Karl R. Popper's falsificationism, Carl Gustav Hempel's criteria of adequacy and the ravens paradox, Rudolph Carnap’s syntactic approach to probability and induction, Nelson Goodman’s “new riddle of induction” and the demise of the syntactic approach, Hans Reichenbach’s pragmatic vindication of induction to Kevin T. Kelly’s formal learning theory that is inspired by work by Hilary Putnam and, finally, modern Bayesian confirmation theory.

Early Works on Induction
While both Bacon 1901 (first published in 1620) and Mill 1973 (first published in 1843) belong to the classics of Western philosophy, it is Hume 2000 (first published in 1739) that forms the starting point of most work on induction and confirmation. Hume 2000 argues that it is impossible to justify induction. According to him, such a justification consists in a deductively valid or an inductively strong argument to the effect that induction will lead from true premises to true conclusions. On the one hand there is no such argument that is deductively valid and whose premises are restricted to the past and present (and all premises we can take for granted are restricted in this way). On the other hand every argument that is inductively strong will be inductively strong in the very sense at issue and thus is viciously circular. The central theorem of Bayesian induction can be traced back to Bayes' 1763 letter communicated by Richard Price. Laplace 1995 (originally published in 1814)

Bacon’s Novum Organon is the first (modern) work on induction. His method focuses on exclusion or elimination and is sometimes seen as a forerunner of Karl R. Popper’s falsificationism.

A classic in probability, this work collects several of the pioneering results in probability by great mathematicians as well as making important contributions itself. It is also an early precursor to the subjectivist school of thought in probability.

The first statement of what is now known as Bayes’ theorem.

In Book 1, Part 3, section 12 Hume gives the classic formulation of the problem of induction.

LaPlace’s seminal work on probability lays the foundation for “classical” interpretations of probability, which assign probabilities on the basis of symmetry considerations.

In Book 2, chapter 9 Mill presents his famous “Methods of Experimental Inference.” These can be considered to form the first attempt at formulating a system of inductive logic.
Nonprobabilistic Theories of Confirmation

Popper’s 1994 falsificationism has been popular among scientists but does not have many defenders in today’s philosophy of science. It is slightly misleading to list Reichenbach 1938 among nonprobabilistic theories of confirmation, but Reichenbach’s work has led almost exclusively to non-Bayesian accounts of confirmation that do, however, take into account statistics. Goodman 1983 is important because of its criticism of Carnap’s project and for introducing the “new riddle” of induction. Carl Gustav Hempel’s seminal paper on the logic of confirmation (Hempel 1945) is a must-read for anybody interested in confirmation. Hempel 1945 (part I) discusses the Nicod criterion of confirmation according to which universal generalizations of the form “all Fs are Gs” are supported by “instances” of the form “a is F and G.” Hempel then presents the famous ravens paradox. By the Nicod criterion, a nonblack nonraven confirms the hypothesis that all nonblack things are nonravens. But that hypothesis is logically equivalent to the ravens hypothesis that all ravens are black. So a nonblack nonraven can be used to confirm the ravens hypothesis. Hempel 1945 (part II) states the prediction criterion of confirmation (which Hempel rejects), the satisfaction criterion of confirmation (his official theory), and the following four conditions of adequacy on any relation of confirmation: the entailment condition, the consequence condition, the consistency condition, and the converse consequence condition. He shows these four conditions to entail that any two statements confirm each other. This leads him to reject the converse consequence condition. Glymour 1980 is a historically informed discussion of theory testing in the tradition of Hempel but with a novel twist to it known as “bootstrap confirmation.” Gemes 1993 offers a sophisticated refinement of the view that confirmation amounts to verifying the consequences of a theory. Sprenger 2013 synthesizes deductivist views, like that of Gemes, with instance confirmation views, like that of Hempel, to obtain a more resilient theory of confirmation. Sprenger 2011 is an overview of hypothetico-deductivist theories of confirmation. Another nonprobabilistic paradigm is that of formal learning theory (Kelly 1996). The latter has been inspired by work by Hilary Putnam (see Probabilistic Theories of Confirmation) among others and evaluates methods in terms of the reliability with which they find out the correct answer to a given question. The use of a method to answer a question is permissible when the method reliably answers the question, if any method does. There are different senses of reliability corresponding to how hard a question is to answer, which provides a classification of all problems in terms of their complexity. Schulte 2012 provides an overview of formal learning theory. It is fair to say that formal learning theory is not too popular among philosophers, and part of the explanation for this is that it requires a substantial background in mathematical logic.
This paper presents a substantial revision of the hypothetico-deductive view of confirmation. The general idea of such views is that a hypothesis is confirmed when its observable consequences are verified.

Glymour’s “bootstrap confirmation” incorporates the idea that, when a whole theory is tested, some parts can be used in testing other parts. The book also contains a chapter in which Glymour explains why he is not a Bayesian. The problem of old evidence raised there is one of the most discussed problems of Bayesian confirmation theory.

Goodman’s book, which was first published in 1954, marks the demise of Carl Gustav Hempel’s and Rudolph Carnap’s syntactic approach to confirmation. His famous new riddle of induction allegedly shows that no purely syntactic notion of confirmation can be adequate.

The first part of Hempel’s seminal paper on the logic of confirmation discusses the Nicod criterion of confirmation and presents the famous ravens paradox, while the second part lays out his prediction criterion of confirmation, the satisfaction criterion of confirmation, and four famous conditions of adequacy on any relation of confirmation.

This is the standard reference to formal learning theory.

This book, which was first published in 1935, is Popper’s best-known work in which he famously argues that many scientific hypotheses cannot be verified but can be falsified. Consequently science should put forth bold hypotheses, which are then severely tested. Hypotheses surviving many and severe tests are “corroborated.” Hypotheses that are falsified should be put aside if there are alternative hypotheses that are not falsified.
In this book Reichenbach states the “straight rule” according to which one should conjecture that the limiting relative frequency equals the observed relative frequency. Reichenbach justifies this rule by his “pragmatic vindication of induction”: if any rule converges to the correct limiting relative frequency, then the straight rule does so as well.

A good overview of formal learning theory that is available online.

A broad and accessible overview of hypothetico-deductive theories of confirmation.

After discussing the motivations for confirmation by instances and the hypothetico-deductive models of confirmation, this paper synthesizes the two into a single approach to confirmation by developing a notion of shared content and relevant entailment. The view developed avoids most of the problems that afflict the theories of confirmation that it synthesizes.

Probabilistic Theories of Confirmation
Kolmogorov 1956 formulates the mathematics on which Bayesian confirmation theory is based. Rudolf Carnap is the most important figure in Bayesian confirmation theory. Carnap 1962 and Carnap 1952 are the book-length results of what are now considered to be failed attempts to define probability and confirmation in purely syntactic terms. Putnam 1963 is important because of its criticism of Carnap’s project. Gaifman and Snir 1982 proves important mathematical results for modern Bayesian confirmation theory. Vineberg 2016 provides an overview of the vast philosophical literature on Dutch Book arguments, and Joyce 2003 gives an overview of Bayes’s theorem that provides the basis and name for Bayesian confirmation theory. Hawthorne 2012 provides an excellent
overview of inductive logics. Joyce 1998 is a highly influential paper on the foundations of subjective Bayesianism, whereas Maher 2006 defends a particular version of objective Bayesianism.

Carnap, Rudolf. The Continuum of Inductive Methods. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952. This is Carnap’s continuation of his attempt to define, in purely syntactic terms, a logical measure of probability. His program is slightly less ambitious now in that he is content with providing criteria that determine a set of measures that are characterized by a parameter $\lambda$ rather than a unique measure. $\lambda$ is inversely proportional to the impact of the (dis-)confirming information.

Carnap, Rudolf. Logical Foundations of Probability. 2d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. This is Carnap’s opus magnum on probability and confirmation, which was first published in 1950. He attempts to provide a set of criteria that single out one probability measure as the unique logical measure of probability. Among others, Carnap introduces the important distinction between absolute confirmation (conditional probability) and incremental confirmation (increase in probability) and argues that Carl Gustav Hempel mixes them up when presenting his four conditions of adequacy.

Gaifman, Haim, and Marc Snir. “Probabilities over Rich Languages, Testing, and Randomness.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (1982): 495–548. Gaifman and Snir’s convergence theorems proved in this paper belong to the most important mathematical results that form the basis of modern Bayesian confirmation theory.


Joyce, James M. “A Non-Pragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.” Philosophy of Science 65 (1998): 575–603. In this paper Joyce presents an argument to the effect that degrees of belief violating the probability calculus are accuracy dominated in the sense that there exists an alternative degree of belief function that is closer to the truth no matter which possible world turns out to be actual. This non-pragmatic justification has received a lot of attention and is important for Bayesian confirmation theory, because the latter usually assumes that confirmation is a function of an agent’s degrees of belief.
An excellent overview on Bayes’s theorem and its importance for Bayesian confirmation theory that is available online. Joyce favors a confirmation-theoretic pluralism according to which there are several legitimate measures of incremental confirmation: each of them measures an important evidential relationship, but the relationships they measure are importantly different.

In this book, which was first published in 1933, Kolmogorov lays the axiomatic foundations for the modern theory of probability that underlies Bayesian confirmation theory.

One of Maher’s recent articles on his neo-Carnapian program that rejects the idea that subjective probabilities should be interpreted as degrees of belief, a view held by many researchers in Bayesian confirmation theory. Maher defends a logical concept of inductive probability.

Putnam’s critique of Carnap’s inductive logic formulated in this paper inspired the development of formal learning theory.

An excellent overview of pragmatic “Dutch book” arguments for probabilism—the thesis that degrees of belief should obey the axioms of probability—that is available online.

Modern Bayesian Confirmation Theory
There are many excellent and important papers in modern Bayesian confirmation theory. The following is an opinionated but representative sample. Milne 1996 exemplifies a position known as confirmation-theoretic monism according to which there is one and only one “true” measure of confirmation. Fitelson 1999 explains why the choice of a measure of confirmation matters even if one
is only interested in comparative confirmation. Christensen 1999 and Hawthorne 2005 are much-cited papers on the problem of old evidence, and Fitelson 2008 is an excellent paper on the new riddle of induction. Eells and Fitelson 2002 and Crupi, Tentori and Gonzalez 2007 examine desirable symmetries of confirmation when confirmation is understood as a kind of partial entailment. Huber 2008 presents an alternative account of hypotheses evaluation in the Bayesian paradigm. Crupi and Tentori 2014 presents results relating information and confirmation. Van Enk 2014 takes up the relationship between confirmation measures and measures of the accuracy of a probability function.

Christensen defends a particular measure of incremental confirmation that is able to solve the quantitative problem of old evidence. If formulated in terms of so-called Popper measures rather than classical probabilities, it is the same proposal as the one in Joyce 1999 (cited under Textbooks).

This is a concise overview of results connecting information, entropy, and confirmation.

This paper offers an in-depth discussion of the properties of confirmation measures, extending Eells and Fitelson 2002. It proposes a new confirmation measure, and shows how it relates to existing measures. It also presents empirical research on how well measures of confirmation capture the judgments of actual subjects.

In this influential paper Fitelson shows that many arguments in the literature on Bayesian confirmation theory are measure sensitive in the sense that their validity depends on which of the many measures of incremental confirmation one works with.

This is a very clearly written and illuminating discussion of Nelson Goodman’s new riddle of induction. Fitelson argues that Goodman’s new riddle of induction can be parried in Bayesian
confirmation theory if one is willing to make certain assumptions that seem to be necessary on independent grounds (in particular, due to the problem of old evidence).

This paper examines symmetries of confirmation (or evidential support), argues that some symmetries for confirmation are counterintuitive, and rules out some measures on that basis.

This paper uses comparisons of how well a subject is doing before and after receiving information to construct confirmation measures. It includes a new confirmation measure (generated from the Kullback-Leibler divergence in information theory) with interesting properties.

The paper argues that the notion of probability used in explicating confirmation is more akin to Rudolph Carnap’s logical probability than to subjective probability as it is used in decision theory.

This paper presents an account according to which there are two conflicting values a theory should exhibit: truth and informativeness. The account is given a Bayesian formulation and justification by showing that, on this account, the most informative among all true theories eventually comes out on top.

A much-cited attempt to argue for one particular measure of incremental confirmation as the measure of confirmation on the basis of five seemingly obvious principles. Milne’s position in this paper exemplifies confirmation-theoretic monism that is opposed to Joyce’s confirmation-theoretic pluralism (see Joyce 2003, cited under General Overviews).